Formal and informal fallacies refer to errors in reasoning or logic, which result from invalid arguments. Formal fallacies refer to arguments that have an invalid structure or 'form', while informal fallacies refer to arguments that have incorrect or irrelevant premises. There are many formal and informal fallacies that could theoretically occur in anaesthesia practice or in the appraisal of anaesthesia research. This paper describes several such potential fallacies. It is possible that a greater awareness, recognition and discussion of these logic-based errors will lead to improved patient safety and more informed appraisal of clinical research.
Several forms of error are recognised in clinical anaesthesia. These can be broadly classified as human errors, which relate to active failures, and system errors, which relate to latent conditions 1,2 . Human errors have been further classified as knowledge-, rule-or skill-based 1, 2 . They may vary in severity from slips and lapses, through to overt mistakes. By definition, errors are unintentional, whereas violations involve some degree of active risk-taking 3 . Most errors do not result in patient harm because they are recognised and corrected early enough, or there are systems in place to prevent harm occurring. However, occasionally errors are of sufficient severity, or occur in particular combinations, such that harm cannot be avoided.
One type of human error that has rarely been discussed explicitly in anaesthetic practice is logicbased error or 'error in reasoning'. Nevertheless, the role of error in cognitive processing has been well described [1] [2] [3] [4] . For example, errors in reasoning may influence the application of knowledge in clinical situations or the choice of rule. Similarly, skilled tasks often involve multiple cognitive processes, which may be impaired by errors in reasoning. In addition, logic-based errors may contribute to errors in deliberation, when a plan has to be developed on first principles, because no obvious rules apply 5 . Therefore, a more explicit discussion might offer insights into several categories of human error. This paper describes various logic-based errors that could occur in anaesthetic practice. Most of the errors will be familiar to the majority of anaesthetists, although the nomenclature or logical basis may not be broadly appreciated. In many cases, the examples are oversimplifications and may be open to challenge. The paper also describes various logic-based errors that could occur in the interpretation of clinical studies. It is hoped that a greater awareness, recognition and discussion of logic-based errors will lead to improved patient safety and more informed appraisal of clinical research.
METHODS
Logic-based errors are discussed extensively in standard textbooks on logic 6, 7 . They have also been outlined in several recent popular paperbacks on logic-based topics [8] [9] [10] . They are also discussed on several websites, which can be accessed using basic search terms such as logic, error, argument and fallacies. Logic, and logic-based error, are in the public domain with no direct attribution possible. In this paper the basic principles of logic-based error will be applied to anaesthetic practice and the appraisal of clinical research. As logic is an extensive topic, the reader is referred to standard textbooks for more detailed discussion.
BASIC TErMINOLOGy Valid vs invalid arguments
An argument is a sequence of statements used to provide justification for a conclusion. In contrast, an assertion is a single statement without supporting justification. An argument typically consists of two or more premises, although sometimes one of the premises is suppressed (implicit or assumed). For an argument to be valid in its strictest sense, its structure or 'form' must be such that the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. The corollary is that if the conclusion is not a logical consequence of the premises, the argument is invalid.
Deductive vs inductive arguments
In a valid deductive argument, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. In contrast, in a valid inductive argument, the conclusion is most likely true but not necessarily true. Inductive arguments use past experience to make predictions about future events. The fact that the sun has always risen in the east (excluding at the North or South Pole!) is good grounds for concluding that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow. This is inductive reasoning because it is almost certainly correct, but we cannot be absolutely sure until we see it rise tomorrow. On the other hand, if we are facing due east, we can deduce with absolute certainty that the opposite direction is due west. This is deductive reasoning, because west is always in the opposite direction to east.
Deductive reasoning is truth preserving, so long as the premises are true by definition (e.g. west is in the opposite direction to east). However, much deductive reasoning uses premises that are themselves the result of inductive reasoning and are not true by definition. For example, the premise 'If you directly observe the sun rising, you are facing east', which could be used in a deductive argument, is based on inductive reasoning (previous observations). In these cases, the conclusion is only as true as the premises. Overall, science is far more inductive than deductive. In our dealing with the world, we often have to accept arguments that are only 'most likely true', because this is the best information that we have available at the time.
Formal vs informal fallacy
A 'fallacy' can be defined as any invalid argument. In a 'formal' fallacy, the structure or 'form' of the argument is invalid. This means that the conclusion is not a logical consequence of the premises, even if the premises are true. Often, formal fallacies appear superficially similar to valid arguments and therefore may be easy to miss. Errors of reasoning that involve aspects of an argument other than its 'form' are known as 'informal' fallacies.
FOrMAL FALLACIES IN ANAESTHETIC PrACTICE
Affirming the consequent Affirming the consequent is a formal fallacy with a superficial similarity to a valid argument known as affirming the antecedent. Affirming the antecedent takes the following form:
If p, then q p Therefore, q
For example: If we are ventilating the lungs (p), we will hear breath sounds (q).
We are ventilating the lungs (p). Therefore, we will hear breath sounds (q). This is a valid argument (assuming that the stethoscope is working and that the patient does not have bilateral large bullae etc.). On the other hand, affirming the consequent takes the following form:
If p, thenTherefore, p
Using the same example: If we are ventilating the lungs (p), we will hear breath sounds (q).
We can hear breath sounds (p). Therefore, we are ventilating the lungs (q). This is a formal fallacy. We might be ventilating the lungs, but the 'breath' sounds we hear may be emanating from the stomach. Failure to recognise this possibility might result in a missed oesophageal intubation.
Another example of affirming the consequent is as follows:
If a patient has severe bronchospasm (p), he or she will be difficult to ventilate (q). This patient is difficult to ventilate (q). Therefore, this patient has severe bronchospasm (p).
The patient might have severe bronchospasm, but there are many other causes of difficulty in ventilation. Failure to appreciate this might result in failure to recognise airway obstruction. (Absence of wheeze and breath sounds may be taken as an indication of the severity of the bronchospasm. If the patient has a history of asthma or has developed unrelated urticaria, the scenario will be even more compelling.)
Further examples of affirming the consequent are given in Table 1 .
Denying the antecedent
Denying the antecedent is another type of formal fallacy. It has a superficial similarity to a valid argument known as denying the consequent. Denying the consequent takes the following form:
If p, then q Not q Therefore, not p
For example: If a patient has had a meal recently (and has not vomited) (p), he or she will have full stomach (q).
This patient does not have a full stomach (and has not vomited) (not q).
Therefore, he or she has not had a meal recently (not p). This is a valid argument. On the other hand, denying the antecedent takes the following form:
If p then q Not p Therefore, not q Using the same example: If a patient has had a meal recently (and has not vomited) (p), he or she will have a full stomach (q).
This patient has not had a meal recently (not p). Therefore, he or she will not have a full stomach (not q).
Not p, therefore not q, is a formal fallacy. The patient might not have a full stomach. However, if he or she has a bowel obstruction or another reason for delayed gastric emptying, the stomach may be full despite no recent meal. Failure to take adequate precautions could result in regurgitation and aspiration of gastric contents.
The following is another example of denying the antecedent:
If a patient has a history of difficult intubation (p), he or she will be difficult to intubate (q).
This patient does not have a history of difficult intubation (not p).
Therefore, he or she will not be difficult to intubate (not q).
tabLe 1 Examples of formal fallacies involving 'affirming the consequent'
If a patient is adequately anaesthetised (p), he or she will not move (q). This patient is not moving (q). Therefore, he or she is adequately anaesthetised (p), … but he or she may be awake and paralysed.
If a drug infusion is delivered to a patient (p), the syringe will empty (q). This syringe is emptying (q). Therefore, the drug infusion is being delivered to the patient (p), … but the drug infusion may be disconnected.
If a patient's anaesthesia is too light (p), his or her heart rate will increase (q). This patient's heart rate has increased (q). Therefore, his or her anaesthesia is too light (p), … but the heart rate may increase for other reasons.
If a patient develops anaphylaxis (p), he or she will have severe hypotension (q). This patient has severe hypotension (q). Therefore, he or she has developed anaphylaxis (p), … but there are other causes for severe hypotension.
If an introducer needle is in a vein (p), the blood will be dark (q). The blood is dark (q). Therefore, the introducer needle is in a vein (p), … but the arterial oxygen saturation may be low. If a patient reports reflux symptoms (p), he or she has a risk of aspiration (q). This patient does not report reflux symptoms (not p). Therefore, he or she does not have a risk of aspiration (not q), … but patients may have other risks for aspiration.
If a patient has stridor (p), he or she will be difficult to ventilate (q). This patient does has not have stridor (not p). Therefore, he or she will not be difficult to ventilate (not q), … but there may be other causes for airway obstruction.
If an epidural test dose is positive (p), the catheter is intravascular (q). The epidural test dose is not positive (not p). Therefore, the catheter is not intravascular (not q), … but the catheter's position may change.
If a patient is intubated (p), ventilation will be possible (q). This patent is not intubated (not p). Therefore, ventilation will not be possible (not q), … but ventilation may be achieved without intubation.
If a patient has taken clopidogrel (p), he or she has a risk of spinal haematoma (q). This patient has not taken clopidogrel (not p). Therefore, he or she does not have a risk of spinal haematoma (not q), … but there is a baseline risk even without clopidogrel. … but the history may be unreliable or the patient's anatomy may have changed. relying on the history alone without an adequate airway assessment may be hazardous.
Further examples of denying the antecedent are given in Table 2 .
INFOrMAL FALLACIES IN ANAESTHETIC PrACTICE
Informal fallacies may have a valid structure or form, but the premises are either untrue or irrelevant. In other words, all fallacies that are not formal fallacies can be considered informal fallacies. There are a large number of examples of informal fallacies. The following are only a small sample and are simplified for illustrative purposes. The brackets indicate that the premises are often suppressed (implied or assumed) rather than stated.
Truth by authority
The professor thinks the tracheal tube is in the correct place.
(The professor is always right.) Therefore, the tracheal tube is in the correct place. … but the professor may not always be right.
This example may be considered absurd. However, consider the following:
The professor has not expressed any doubt about the position of the tracheal tube.
(The professor has extensive knowledge and experience and would express concern if there were any doubt about the position of the tracheal tube.) Therefore, there is no doubt about the position of the tracheal tube!
Truth by democracy
The majority of anaesthetists think nitrous oxide is safe.
(The majority determines what is true.) Therefore, nitrous oxide is safe.
Nitrous oxide may or may not be safe, but this is not affected by the proportion of anaesthetists who think it is safe. In a situation where there is a controversy or major difference of opinion, the truth cannot be determined by the majority view.
Ad antiquitam
Nerve stimulation techniques have been used for nerve blocks for decades.
(Older techniques are always best.) Therefore, nerve stimulation techniques are best for nerve blocks. … but older techniques may not always be best.
Ad novitam
Total intravenous anaesthesia is the newest form of general anaesthesia.
(Newer techniques are always best.) Therefore, total intravenous anaesthesia is the best form of general anaesthesia. … total intravenous anaesthesia may or may not be the best form of general anaesthesia, but this is not determined by its 'newness'.
Everybody knows
Every anaesthetist knows that you should confirm the ability to ventilate before giving muscle relaxants.
(This information is so basic it is self-evident.) Therefore, you should confirm the ability to ventilate before giving muscle relaxants.
…. but every anaesthetist may not agree and those who do agree could be wrong. This practice may be a standard of care, but it also may be dogma.
Appeal to emotion
A young woman developed an epidural abscess following an epidural for caesarean section and never walked again. She could not walk home with her baby.
(Avoiding epidural anaesthesia avoids the risk of epidural abscess.) Therefore, we should avoid epidural anaesthesia for caesarean sections. … but all techniques are associated with risks, including this counterexample … A young woman had a general anaesthetic for caesarean section, was impossible to ventilate and had a hypoxic brain injury. She never woke to see her baby.
(Avoiding general anaesthesia avoids the risk of hypoxic brain injury.) Therefore, we should avoid general anaesthesia for caesarean sections.
Further examples of informal fallacies are given in Table 3 .
FOrMAL FALLACIES IN THE APPrAISAL OF CLINICAL rESEArCH
Affirming the consequent If a paper is valid (p), it will be published (q). This paper is valid (p). Therefore, it will be published (q). This is a valid argument, assuming that the paper is also original and relevant, and that these qualities are not missed in the peer review process! On the other hand, the argument… If a paper is valid (p), it will be published (q). This paper is published (q). Therefore, it is valid (p). …is a formal fallacy (affirming the consequent). While a published paper may be valid, there are many reasons why it may not be valid. This applies to all papers in all journals, irrespective of reputation of the authors, their affiliation or the impact factor of the journal in which it is published. The same applies to the paper's originality and relevance.
Denying the antecedent
If a paper is valid (p), it will be published (q). This paper is not valid (not p). Therefore, it will not be published (not q). … but there are many reasons why an invalid paper might be published.
INFOrMAL FALLACIES IN THE APPrAISAL OF CLINICAL rESEArCH Truth by authority
The recent review by Professor X found that continuous spinal anaesthesia is safe.
(Professor X is a world authority on spinal anaesthesia.) Therefore, continuous spinal anaesthesia is safe. … but Professor X's review may have been flawed. The review should be assessed on its merits, not its author(s).
In this example, 'review' could be replaced by randomised controlled trial, consensus statement, case series, or any other type of paper. Similarly, 'Professor X' could be replaced by any form of 'authority' (e.g. group of experts, the affiliation of the experts or the journal in which the paper is published).
Truth by democracy
Most papers on aprotinin have reported no increase in mortality.
(The majority determines what is true.) Therefore, aprotinin does not increase mortality. … but the majority may be wrong. Scientific papers should be assessed on their quality, not their quantity.
Ad antiquitam
Early studies on epidural anaesthesia found that it reduced perioperative mortality.
(Older studies are always best.) Therefore, epidural anaesthesia reduces perioperative mortality.
…. but older studies may not always be best. Scientific papers should be assessed on their quality, not their age.
Ad novitam
A new study indicates that epidural anaesthesia does not reduce perioperative mortality.
(Newer studies are always best.) Therefore, epidural anaesthesia does not reduce perioperative mortality. … but newer studies may not always be best. Scientific papers should be assessed on their quality, not on how recently they have been published. (It is important to maintain traditions.) Therefore, it is important that anaesthesia trainees continue to work 24 h shifts, … but traditional practices may be inappropriate.
Non-anticipation
If general anaesthesia caused postoperative cognitive dysfunction, we would have found out about it long ago. (We did not find out about it long ago.) Therefore, general anaesthesia does not cause postoperative cognitive dysfunction, … but we may not have recognised it before.
The gambler's fallacy
My last patient developed anaphylaxis. On average, the risk of anaphylaxis is about 1:10,000. Therefore, the risk of anaphylaxis in my next patient will be less than 1:10,000, … but the risk is unchanged.
Ad hominem
We cannot take Dr X's advice. We all know he smokes (and smokers cannot give good advice), … but quality of advice is unaffected by smoking.
rationalisation (everybody does it)
It is common practice for anaesthetists to take personal phone calls in the operating room. (Common practice determines what is acceptable.) Therefore, it is acceptable to take personal phone calls in the operating room, …. but phone calls may be a distraction from patient care.
Slippery slope (thin end of the wedge)
If we accept mobile phones calls in the operating theatre, the next thing will be checking of emails, facebook entries, and twittering.
(Checking of emails, facebook entries, and twittering may be distracting.) Therefore, we should not accept mobile phone calls, … but we may be able to 'draw the line' at mobile phone calls.
(Premises in brackets are often suppressed). 
Non-anticipation
If nitrous oxide were unsafe, it would have been reported long ago.
It was not reported long ago. Therefore, this paper suggesting that nitrous oxide is unsafe must be wrong. … but the paper may have used techniques to detect nitrous oxide toxicity that were not previously available.
Ad hominem
The paper by author X must be invalid. We all know he is a climate change sceptic.
(And climate change sceptics cannot write valid papers.) … but writing papers on anaesthesia is unrelated to personal views on climate change.
DISCUSSION
The examples in this paper describe many potential logic-based errors that could be made by anaesthetists in their clinical practice or in their appraisal of clinical research. Most of the errors are obvious and would be easily identified by the majority of anaesthetists in the majority of situations. However, it is possible that in rare instances, or in particular clinical scenarios, the errors could go unrecognised, leaving the potential for patient harm. It is also possible that logical errors in the appraisal of clinical research could lead occasionally to the acceptance of flawed findings. For these reasons, an understanding of the basis for logical errors may be worthwhile.
The examples in this paper were chosen to describe the various types of fallacy, rather than to comment on best practice. In fact, in many cases, counterexamples are presented. Moreover, the examples were simplified so as to focus on the error in logic, rather than the clinical scenario. In practice, the scenarios leading to logic-based errors may be much more complex, much more subtle or both. Similarly, it would be extremely unlikely for an adverse outcome to be related to a logic-based error alone. It would be more likely for a logic-based error to be only one of many contributory factors in an adverse outcome, aligning with other errors as described in the Swiss Cheese model 11 .
It is now appreciated that errors in clinical practice are common (near misses, critical incidents), but that errors resulting in actual patient harm (accidents) are rare [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [12] [13] [14] . It is also recognised that patient harm does not imply that an error has occurred. The standard approach to the study of error is through the retrospective analysis of incidents and accidents. Incidents can be studied through the assessment and discussion of critical incident reports, which are usually voluntary. Accidents can be studied through the assessment of morbidity and mortality reports, sentinel events, confidential reports to government or other agencies, closed claims analysis and root-cause analyses. In most cases, while the error can be identified objectively, the contribution of the error to the adverse outcome is determined on the balance of probabilities. This is because errors do not always lead to adverse outcomes and adverse outcomes can occur without error. The aim is to identify deficits that can be remedied or to modify the system such that the error itself, or its ability to cause harm, can be prevented.
There have been no previous studies aimed specifically at identifying logic-based errors in anaesthetic practice, although the cognitive processes in human error have been well-described [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 15, 16 . The study of logic-based errors may be difficult, because voluntary reports or survey responses would be unreliable. Clinicians might readily identify knowledge, rule, skill-based and technical errors. However, they may not recognise, let alone report, instances in which they were 'not thinking correctly'. Nevertheless, in some situations, a clinician may not be able to explain an erroneous decision, other than through an error in reasoning.
Logic-based errors are not a separate category of human error. rather, they are a potential component of other categories of error that involve a cognitive element. For example, using the reason model, a knowledge-based error may involve a knowledge deficit alone, an error in the application of knowledge or some combination of the two. The same may apply to rules and skills. This is clearer when using the expanded model of runciman et al 5 . In this model, the categories of error include errors in information, acquisition of knowledge, perception, matching, knowledge stored as schemata, knowledge stored as rules, skill-based errors, slips and lapses, errors in choice of rule, technical errors, and deliberative errors 5 . Most, if not all, of the categories in this classification involve some cognitive element, which could be subject to an error in reasoning. Nevertheless, errors in these categories are not limited to logic-based errors and may be only a small subset.
The potential for errors in reasoning to distort mental models of our environment have also been described by Green 15 . He describes how we may 'jump to incorrect conclusions' due to prior expectations. This may be followed by a biased interpretation of subsequent information (confirmatory bias), reinforcing our erroneous conclusions, rather than prompting a reassessment (fixation error). Phipps at el have also described a task analysis approach to 'systematic human error reduction and prevention', which includes a number of potential logic-based errors across the range of its error classification 16 . The importance of critical thinking in anaesthesia, together with the role of logic in many aspects of information processing, has been highlighted recently by Shafer 17 .
While many clinical errors might be consistent with a logic-based error, it would be a logic-based error itself to 'jump to the conclusion' that an 'error in reasoning' had occurred. For example, missing an oesophageal intubation by misinterpreting sounds emanating from the stomach could be considered a logic-based error. However, it could also be considered a knowledge-based error if the clinician did not know that these sounds are often similar to breath sounds. It could also be considered a rulebased error, if the anaesthetist had been taught not to rely on breath sounds alone. There could also be a skill-based component if the clinician was undertaking several learned tasks concurrently. There could also be a technical component if the anaesthetist was inexperienced with tracheal intubation. More importantly, there could be one or more system factors. For example, there could have been concurrent fatigue, stress, inadequate supervision or the absence of a CO 2 detection device. Therefore, in the analysis of an incident or accident, the possibility of a logic-based error would have to be considered along with all other types of error, both human and system.
The aim of any study or discussion of error is to develop preventative strategies and to thereby improve patient safety. For human errors, this involves identification of the error, increasing awareness of the error and possibly introducing educational and clinical strategies to prevent the error. This may entail informal discussions at critical incident or morbidity and mortality sessions, or more formal recommendations from confidential enquiries. In many situations, protocols and checklists may be generated. The rationale for many of these activities is based on the premise that increasing the familiarity with an error will reduce its incidence. Fortunately, major anaesthetic disasters are extremely rare. However, they are often unpredictable, and the outcomes can be catastrophic. For this reason, all potential avenues for error reduction are worth exploring.
The second aspect of this paper involved logicbased errors in the critical appraisal of clinical research. It is all too easy for a reader of a scientific paper to assume that if a study is published it must be valid, and that the more renowned the authors, the affiliation, or the journal, the greater the validity. However, these are clear formal fallacies. Similarly, it is common to be confronted by 'truth by authority' or 'truth by democracy' and many other informal fallacies in clinical studies. While clinicians may not have the time to check every aspect of every paper they read, in the absence of a detailed check, they should not assume that all aspects of the paper are valid. Outright fraud is probably rare, but author bias leading to the presentation of findings in the most favourable light is probably very common. Commercial or other conflicts of interest may also lead to inadvertent bias. This does not disappear just because the conflicts are declared. Methodological flaws, including statistical errors, could have been missed in the peer-review process, and the authors' interpretations of their findings might have failed to exclude other plausible explanations. Moreover, reviewers, editors and journals may introduce their own inadvertent bias. readers should accept that the most important appraisal of clinical research occurs after publication, not before.
In summary, this paper describes several formal and informal fallacies in anaesthesia, relating both to clinical practice and the appraisal of clinical research. This paper does not 'prove' the existence of these fallacies, nor suggest specific preventative strategies. The paper seeks only to increase the awareness of logic-based errors at an introductory level and to speculate on their potential contribution to adverse outcomes. It is possible that by increased awareness and discussion of logic-based errors, their incidence and impact can be reduced.
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